Overcoming Egalitarian Objections to Utilitarianism

(rought draft)

1. Introduction.

For the purposes of this paper, I will define Utilitarianism (or Welfarism) as the claim that nothing except well-being has intrinsic value in order to distinguish it from other forms of Consequentialism.  In this paper, I will defend the Utilitarian claim that  there is nothing which can make one population (which I will equate with a system or state of affairs) have more intrinsic value than some other population which has an equal amount of well-being, pace Egalitarianism.  In order to argue for this conclusion, I will argue that the rightness of equality can be demonstrated under Utilitarianism whereas under Egalitarianism it is simply assumed.  A second argument could but will not be put forward along lines of parsimony: some moral theory, A, is better than any other moral theory, B, if A is able to explain the same data will fewer theoretical posits.

The Chinese Room and Chinese Robot as Distinct Thought Experiments

(This is a third draft of a paper which I am working on for my Philosophy of Consciousness seminar. It is also a paper which I may eventually use for my writing sample, so thoughtful criticisms are greatly appreciated.)

The Chinese Room and the Chinese Robot

as Distinct Thought Experiments

In his seminal paper, “Minds, Brains and Programs,”[1] John Searle noted with seeming amusement that his opponents could not agree on what the proper reply to his Chinese Room thought experiment should be.[2] The objective of this paper will not be to add to the confusion which surrounds Searle’s argument by defending a reply which has already been offered, or, worse still, by providing yet another reply to his argument.  Instead, my primary focus will be to describe where the debate between Searle and his interlocutors has gone astray as well as point out where Searle’s argument is in critical need of clarification.  More to the point, I will argue that both sides of the debate have failed to appreciate, if not recognize that there are two highly distinct thought experiments which are at play throughout Searle’s paper, each aimed at illustrating a very different point.  Once these separate thought experiments, along with their independent conclusions are properly isolated from each other, one can then clearly identify the points of difference between Searle and his opponents as well as the exact point at which each side in the debate begins to speak past the other.

Darwin’s Use of Consilience and Analogy in the Origin of Species

Soon after the publication of Origin of Species, Charles Darwin wrote the following in a letter to Hugh Falconer:

“You were very antagonistic to my views on species.  I well knew this would be the case.  I must freely confess, the difficulties and objections are terrific; but I cannot believe that a false theory would explain, as it seems to me it does explain, so many classes of facts.”[1]

Eliminating P-Consciousness

My Philosophy of Mind professor is apparently in the midst of an eliminativist crisis in terms of phenomenal consciousness.  His argument is basically as follows:  1) There would be absolutely no difference between those individuals which actually have phenomenal consciousness and those individuals who labor under the false belief that they have phenomenal consciousness.  2) Phenomenal consciousness is far more metaphysically strange than is a false-phenomenal-consciousness-belief making mechanism in the brain.  3) Thus, the eliminative position is preferable to the alternative.

Adaptationisms

In his essay “Three Kinds of Adaptationism” Peter Godfrey-Smith argues that the debate surrounding adaptationism actually consists of three distinct and logically independent debates.  In this paper I will consider the three adaptationist positions which Godfrey-Smith sees are at stake in such debates as well as his argument for their logical independence of one another.  I will then argue that Godfrey-Smith’s argument is based in premises which are not accepted by all parties in such debates and thus serves to confuse rather than clarify the issues at hand.   I will then attempt to salvage a modified form of Godfrey-Smith’s argument so as to make it acceptable to all sides of the adaptationism debate and thereby achieve his goal of “classification and clarification.” (Godfrey-Smith, 1)

Animal Rights

In his paper “The Case for Animal Rights” Tom Regan argues from a roughly Kantian perspective that animals have intrinsic value equal to that of humans and as such should cease to be used as mere resources for others.  In this paper, I will detail both Regan’s position as well as the argument which he mounts in its favor.  It will be shown that though his argument is valid, it is not sound, being based on a number of unacceptable premises.  Whether attempts at replacing the unacceptable premises with more appropriate ones provide a legitimate defense of animal rights or not is left as an open question.

The Chinese Room, pt. 8

The systems objection, which I take to be identical (or at least nearly so) with the virtual mind reply, suggests that the Chinese Room argument is entirely beside the point. When Searle says “It seems to me quite obvious in the example that I do not understand a word of the Chinese stories,” the computationalist merely need reply, “So what?” The English speaker has a representation of Chinese-speaking syntax, a phenomenon which is entirely independent of the representation which is supposed to be created by the latter. This confusion of representation/consciousness/understanding of syntax and the syntax of representation/consciousness/understanding is the primary motivation which makes Searle’s conclusion so ‘obvious’ or intuitive.

The Chinese Room, pt. 7

The Chinese Room is not merely intended as a refutation of Strong AI, but also as demonstration of the unreliability of the Turing Test for intelligence.  According to John Searle, the Chinese Room passes the Turing Test without being intelligent in the relevant sense, therefore passing the Turing Test is not sufficient for having intelligence.  It is, partially, for this reason that Searle reintroduces all the chauvinistic and prejudicial preconditions for intelligence (I will use the terms ‘intelligence’, ‘conscious’ and ‘understanding’ rather interchangeably) that Turing attempted to dispose of with his test in the form of causal powers.

The Chinese Room, pt. 6

Here is the outline of a presentation I am going to give tonight in my Philosophy of Mind seminar:

The Chinese Room, pt. 5

Many have seen a glaring problem with Searle’s use of the Chinese Room Argument, namely that it shows too much.  If we place the necessary conditions for the mental too high, we run the risk of thereby disqualifying human-mentality.  It is with this very idea in mind that Searle embraces a seemingly vague position in which biological matter has some undefined and undescovered capacity to cause mental states, whatever those are for Searle.  This appeal to our “causal powers” is essentially the only vangaurd which Searle has against the brain-simulator reply.