Minds, Meaning and Morals

March 28, 2006

“There is no evidence for that”

Filed under: argumentation, biology, religion — Jeff G @ 12:15 pm

In many debates, especially those which have been popularized, one frequently hears the assertion, “There is no evidence for that.” In this post I will consider this response and how it lends itself to abuse, especially in the public sphere. In order to illustrate this abuse, I will provide a number of examples from current debates as to how this line is (mis)appropriated. I will then proceed to discuss the proper use of this line in relation to the burdens of proof and rejoinder. (more…)

Reducing the Subjective to the Objective: Searle

Filed under: culture, metaphysics — Jeff G @ 9:18 am

In the last post we discussed the differences between objective/subjective features in ontological and subjective matters. In this post we will proceed with Searle’s account of The Construction of Social Reality by considering how objects can acquire both ontologically objective as well as ontologically subjective features. We will also see that ontologically subjective features can in principle be reduced to ontologically objective features in the natural world. (more…)

March 27, 2006

Four Quests for Knowledge: Searle

Filed under: epistemology, metaphysics — Jeff G @ 11:18 am

In his book The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle draws a distinction between four metaphysical/epistemic categories: epistemically objective, epistemically subjective, ontologically objective and ontologically subjective. It will be the purpose of this post to investigate the differences which lie between these four categories as well as provide some examples of each. (more…)

Begging Religious Questions

Filed under: argumentation, ethics, religion — Jeff G @ 8:24 am

Religious answers to some of the questions which philosophy attempts to address can be seen as an effort (though not necessarily conscious) to avoid the questions altogether. The response which they give as to the origins of design, morality and purpose are all question begging. Now I fully understand that many religious people do not actually give such shallow answers to these questions, but it cannot be denied that those who do give them (and there are an awful lot that do) are religious. (more…)

March 26, 2006

Right Based Theories of Morality and Value

Filed under: ethics, rationality — Jeff G @ 8:42 pm

While last post we considered good based theories of ethics, this post will deal with right based theories. I will briefly consider Kant’s theory of ethics, highlighting some of the less well understood aspects of it. Having outlined Kant’s theory, I will proceed consider some objections to it which I find more compelling. (more…)

Good Based Theories of Morality and Value

Filed under: ethics, metaethics — Jeff G @ 3:20 pm

Good based theories for ethics have a long and rich history originating back with the Greeks. Today the most viable form of a good based theory comes in the form of Utilitarianism. In this post I will consider the history of Utilitarianism as well as it account of good, right and virtue. I will then proceed to relate some of the short comings of good based theories in general along with a possible response available to such theorists. (more…)

Values, Ought’s and the Good Life

Filed under: axiology, ethics, metaethics — Jeff G @ 11:55 am

In Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics he asks the reader to consider “whether happiness is among the things that are praised or rather among the things which are prized.” In this post I will ask this question not about happiness, but rather what is good in general. How do the is/ought and fact/value distinctions relate to the admirable and enviable? How do questions regarding the admirable and enviable lives inform our concept of the good, both morally as well as non-morally speaking? (more…)

Facts and Values

Filed under: metaethics — Jeff G @ 11:54 am

In a recent post I discussed a proposed attempt by John Searle to bridge the is/ought gap. While his attempt failed in the end, his argument did provide some interesting points to consider. Consider the sentence “It is the case that Cartman ought to share.” Is this an ought statement or an is statement? Searle’s argument, we saw, exploits a similar ambiguity in order to derive a full-blown ought statement from a pseudo is statement. (more…)

March 25, 2006

Analyzing the Good

Filed under: metaethics — Jeff G @ 4:19 pm

In chapter 4 of his book “Utilitarianism”, John Stuart Mill states that ‘what is good’ is ‘what is desired’; nothing more and nothing less. The two are analytically synonymous with each being defined as the other. He then proceeds to argue that happiness is the only thing which people desire. He thus concludes that happiness is the sole good. (more…)

A Rickety Ol’ Bridge From Is to Ought

Filed under: metaethics — Jeff G @ 9:13 am

John Searle attempts to offer what appears to be an example of how the famous Is/Ought gap can be bridged. While whether this account should be understood as an actual attempt to bridge the is/ought gap by Searle is questionable, the strategy which he presents is an intriguing one. In this post I will attempt to analyze each step in his derivation of an ought from an is, after which a series of questions and/or possibilities which the account raises, will be presented without any effort to address them. (more…)

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