Argumentation and Apologetics

In the last post we discussed the problematic nature of religious beliefs in public debate. To illustrate the point, we took the example of the IDer who didn’t accept Neo-Darwinian evolution, not really because of any scientific evidence, but because he believed himself to be privy to God’s infallible truth. What this IDer is engaging in is not debate or legitimate argumentation (not about evolution anyway), but is instead engaged in apologetics. It will be the purpose of this post to explore the difference which exists between apologetics and legitimate debate.

Before we begin, however, we should first note that apologetics, while typically being associated with religion, is not necessarily exclusive to it. While I will continue to use the example of the IDer in this post, I do not deny that people engage in apologetics to defend views which are not motivated by or related to religion.

In order to better understand how apologetics is not argumentation, it will be to our benefit to first discuss what argumentation is. Arguing is basically reason giving; it is the providing of justifications for or in support of a position. Success in an argument consists in the willing assent of a member of your audience, it being composed of both participating interlocutors as well as any passive observers, to the position which you are arguing for.
Such a definition of success, however, is slightly misleading. The real purpose of arguing is not to “win” but to come to an understanding of the truth. Thus we seek the willing and fully informed assent of the audience, entirely free of manipulation or coercion. Since the ultimate purpose of arguing is not to win but to learn, we ourselves must also be open to willing and fully informed assent to another’s position which differs from our own.

It is this environment of mutual respect and willingness to change, as opposed to a desire to win the argument at any cost, that makes argumentation an essentially cooperative rather adversarial endeavor. Engaging in an argument consists of implicitly accepting the risk of being shown wrong or having to alter one’s belief system, and it is the mutual recognition that such risks have been assumed that gives argumentation its cooperative nature. It is the cooperative rather than the adversarial nature of argumentation which makes it a good thing for people to engage in.Apologetics, however, is not a cooperative endeavor. The apologist, if I may call him such, has not assumed the risk of changing his belief system. For example, in the case of our IDer (which is not meant to represent all IDers mind you) even if ever argument which he musters against evolution turns out to be demonstrably wrong, he will still not accept evolution. This is because the arguments which he has provided are not really his reasons for doubting evolution. Instead, the arguments which he presents are simply reasons which happen to point in the same direction, so to speak, with the reasons for why he really doubts evolution. It is the IDers refusal to accept evolution, even after all his arguments have been shown to be wrong, that reveals the apologetic nature of the debate which he is engaged in.

The case of the evolutionist is different in that if his arguments in favor of evolution all turned out to be wrong, he would have to radically alter his belief system. (Of course I realize that not all evolutionists are this way, but we are discussing the nature of argumentation and apologetics, not evolution and ID.) Notice that the point isn’t that one side is convinced that they are right and the other is not. Indeed, if both sides were not convinced that they were right in their respective positions, the argument would be a very shallow and uninteresting one.

The difference is that the arguer is willing to be wrong and adjust his beliefs accordingly while the other is not. In an argument there exists equal ground, not between the positions but between the interlocutors. While each arguer in convinced that his position is right, he or she also recognizes that such is not necessarily the case. This equal ground consists in the mutual acceptance of the risks mentioned above, and is what gives argumentation isn’t cooperative nature.

Such equal ground does not exist in the case of apologetics, for while both parties are convinced that their position is the correct one, at least one of the parties does not even acknowledge that his position might actually be wrong in the end. He is not cooperatively striving to find the truth of the matter, for he “knows” that he already has the truth in the matter. He excludes himself from the audience altogether, for he is not engaged in the discussion to learn, but to instruct. In such a context, the assent of the audience will be sought, be it given freely or not.

It should be clear by now why religious beliefs make such a good illustration of apologetics for the reasons which were mentioned in the last post. The religionist is simply defending a position which he takes to be God’s position. Even if he isn’t able to defend the position very well and all his arguments fall flat on their face, this doesn’t at all change the fact, in his mind, that the position which he defends is the right one anyways. While this is certainly the most obvious example of apologetics, I must again emphasize that such is not necessarily limited to religious beliefs or religious people. The atheist who accepts evolution primarily because it is the only account of a God-less creation available would seem to be just as engaged in apologetics as is our hypothetical IDer.

While the failure to recognize the very possibility of being wrong is one mark of apologetics, it is not the only one, nor is it the most important one in my opinion. The real problem of apologetics lies in the fact that the reasons which the apologist puts forth are not the real reasons for his being convinced of a position. The reasons for why the apologist does this may vary. It could be because they are not very confident in their ability to defend their real reasons. It could be because they are not really aware of what their real reasons are. It could be because their real reasons are entirely private in nature and therefore beyond public argument. It could be because their real reasons are too intimate and personal. Or perhaps it is something else entirely.

Let us consider the example of the IDer who is religiously motivated. He does not reject evolution out of a consideration of punctuated equilibrium or a seeming lack of transitional fossils. Instead, he rejects evolution because the Bible tells another story, or perhaps because such a view seems to rob life of its purpose and meaning. While this IDer might actually be properly arguing about punctuated equilibrium or the presence of transitional fossils, he is not really arguing about evolution at all; he is engaging in apologetics. He is simply presenting reason which can be used to argue against evolution, but even if all these reasons turned out to be dead wrong, he would still believe evolution to be wrong. They are not his real reasons for disbelieving evolution.

While we have discussed what the fundamental differences are between argumentation and apologetics, it would be helpful to list some ways in which apologetics can be identified and distinguished from proper argumentation. Whereas argumentation is marked by its cooperative nature as well as the mutual assumption of various risks and burdens (the burden of proving as assertion and the burden of rejoinder), the endeavor of apologetics is marked by its adversarial nature and the refusal to accept these risks and burdens. Here are some questions which can help identify and distinguish apologetics from proper argumentation:

1. Do both parties modestly acknowledge that they might possibly be wrong?
2. Is there anything that could possibly be presented that would convince them that they are wrong and achieve their willing assent?
3. Do both parties accept the burden of rejoinder by properly engaging the arguments of the other side in an honest manner with the intent of furthering the argument?
4. Do both parties seek agreement by way of cooperative argumentation?
5. Do both parties actively seek to understand the other side’s position in order to properly engage it?
6. Do both parties accept the burden of proof in that they must given reasons for their positions, reasons which might themselves be called into question?
7. Does either party immodestly assume the strength of presumption?