Jean-Jacque Rousseau

We now come to the place in Western intellectual history occupied by Jean-Jacque Rousseau, a Lockean deist who strongly opposed the ideas of progress in the arts and science, a theme which had taken center-stage in the Enlightenment. Indeed, progress by way of learning what had never been learned before, as described in Bacon’s Novum Organum, is precisely what set the New Philosophy apart from that of Aristotelian Scholasticism, the latter being concerned more with seeking a moderate harmony in what had already been learned in the past. In this post we will see how Rousseau, while not advocating any kind of ideals native to pre-Enlightenment society, took serious issue with the most central tenet of the Enlightenment, namely that of progress by way of culture, science and art.

It would be nearly impossible to understand Rousseau’s dissent from progress without understanding his views concerning God. He was a strong deist who, although passionate about religious tolerance, had a strong distaste for atheists. He felt that the philosophers who argued against the existence of God simply must have ulterior motives, for he was convinced that nobody could really in their heart of hearts doubt the existence of God. Aside from the “inner light” which testifies of a God, Rousseau also appeals to teleology by way of the order which is found in nature as well as cosmology in that something must have given motion to the system in which we find ourselves.

Nevertheless, while Rousseau refused to accept the arguments against God, especially the arguments from the existence of evil, he did acknowledge that evil was indeed a problem which must be dealt with somehow. He argued that evil and suffering are, in the end, artificial products of the will of humanity, especially as this will has turned toward culture and cultural progress. We have been made the kings of nature and have used or freedom and power for ill, especially in the unfortunate creation of civilization. In this we see Rousseau’s dissent from Enlightenment ideals.

Rousseau’s defense of the claim that culture is, or at least leads inevitably to decadence follows both historical as well as rational lines of reasoning. He rationally argued that culture, especially in the form of the arts and the sciences, creates and then satisfies artificial “needs” in that they serve human pride, vanity and luxury rather than our natural needs. Additionally, culture leads to laziness and boredom.

Historically speaking, he argued that since the time of the Renaissance, Western polite society had all but abandoned or forgotten the ancient virtues. He saw the resulting social depravity as being identical to the ones which overtook Egypt, Greece and Rome, leading to each civilization’s demise. He insisted that everybody could recognize the moral superiority of the ancient Spartans as opposed to that of cultured Athens. Turning to modern examples, he said that the Swiss as well as the American Indians were clearly more virtuous as well as happier than those of the cultured West.

In his Second Discourse, On the Origins of Inequality, Rousseau paints a picture of life in the pre-social state of nature. In such a state, we were vigorous, healthy and lived according to our God-given natural instinct. Strictly speaking, we were neither morally good nor bad, for we were essentially asocial, an environment in which there was no such thing as ownership either (in stark contrast to Locke’s social contract). In the state of nature, man was marked by general equality, in that any inequalities which arose were entirely natural, and largely inconsequential. While there might have been more early deaths in such a state, those who did mature fully were wonderfully healthy, as Rousseau argued could still be observed in the Native Americans.

The great tragedy of all human history was the creation of permanent human society out of some perceived need for such. Society, according to Rousseau, is a coercively triumphant and dominant institution which inevitably destroys most of the good which is to be found in primitive society. Society introduces various unnatural institutions and states of affairs which are then taken to be “natural” such as division of labor, ownership and property, social inequality and widely accepted social injustice. As stated, it creates artificial needs which then stifle our natural and God-given conscience, breeding selfishness and corruption.

Rousseau sees the consequences of the creation of society as being, to a significant degree, permanent and irreversible. Nevertheless, he does envision a politics and education which are aimed at partially repairing as much of this damage as possible. By way of education, Rousseau advocates a direct education by way of nature, unmediated by men, books or other things. Such an education should begin in infancy and should be an education not only of the mind, but of the physical capabilities as well as the physical senses. Students should be taught according to observation of natural consequences in the service of real and natural needs. Similarly, they should be trained in an honest trade rather than being qualified for an unnatural career. The students should be trained to become as natural as possible.

Politically speaking, Rousseau was a social contractarian, although the differences between his conception of the social contract and that of Hobbes or Locke are significant. According to Rousseau, all individual freedom is given to the state in such a manner that one’s individual happiness is derived from the happiness of society as a whole. This is due to what Rousseau sees as being the superiority of the general good over the particular good. It is only by each individual seeking their own interests by way of pursuing the well-being of others that society and culture can overcome it selfish tendencies.

Similarly, it is the general will, and not merely the will of the majority which is to have political authority, for the desires or artificial needs of the majority will tend to be immoral. Accordingly, to preserve an authentic general will, there can be no factions in society; no gap between rich and poor and thus no societies which are too large for democratic self-governance. Only in such a society could a general will thrive in contradistinction to a particular will, the latter being the very antithesis of freedom.