Physicalism and its Malcontents

Physicalism, something misleadingly called materialism, is the metaphysical position that everything, including mental states and consciousness itself, is physical in nature. In other words, there is no non-physical mind-stuff, soul-stuff or God-stuff of any kind, only physical matter being acted upon by physical forces. Nevertheless, both Frank Jackson in his “Epiphenomenal Qualia” as well as Saul Kripke in his Naming and Necessity offer arguments which are aimed specifically at demonstrating the untenability of physicalism as it applies to mental states. The purpose of this paper will be to briefly consider each of their arguments in turn, as well as provide reasons for why each of their objections is fundamentally flawed.

Thinking Machines

In his classic article “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” Alan Turing lays out what is now known as the Turing Test, a means by which one can, supposedly identify intelligence in another being, regardless of what external qualities this being may or may not have. John Searle, however, finds the Turing Test to be not only insufficient, but entirely misguided altogether, at least in the way in which most would implement it. It will be the purpose of this paper to briefly describe both the Turing Test as well as Searle’s Chinese Room argument, which is intended as a refutation of the former. I will also very briefly consider some of the objections which have been brought against Searle’s Chinese Room argument and conclude that all of these objections are largely irrelevant to Searle’s main point. In the end, I will argue that Searle is correct in calling the Turing Test as an unqualified test of intelligent thought into serious question.

Complex Conceptual Metaphor

In their chapter “Metaphor and Truth” Lakoff and Johnson argue that the traditional theory of metaphor is simply untenable. In this post I would like to engage each of the five tenets of the traditional theory of metaphor which L&J see as being flat out false. In the end, I will argue that while L&J do make some compelling arguments for their position, the arguments which they present against the traditional theory do not necessary require their theory of conceptual metaphor either.

The Neural Basis of Primary Metaphor

Central to the arguments which Lakoff and Johnson (L&J) make in their book, Philosophy in the Flesh, are the claims that 1) most human thought is unconscious, 2) the mind and its structure are fully and inherently embodied, and 3) much or even most of human thought is metaphorical in nature. Indeed, they metaphorical thought as being the most important claim, for they see primary metaphors as being, for the most part, unconscious as well as being structured as well as implemented in the neural mechanisms used in perceptual and motor tasks. Given that so much of what they argue in their book rests on this very claim, it will be to our benefit to investigate their arguments in support these claims.

Emotional Bean-Counting

In his lecture series The Passions: Philosophy and the Intelligence of Emotions, Robert Solomon presents a number of wonderful lectures which I plan to review over the next long while. (Yes, I understand that I have way too many projects going on right now, especially for how slow the posting has been.) One of these great lectures is concerning the relatively shallow way in which we classify emotions as being either good or bad. We will see that such a view, especially as found in the all-too-common reduction to pain and pleasure, is simply inadequate on a number of levels.

Embodied Realism

In their book Philosophy in the Flesh Lakoff and Johnson argue that our understanding of the human mind, as developed in modern cognitive science, forces us to entirely reevaluate many philosophical ideas and assumptions which have shaped the debates over the millennia. They argue that since 1) the human mind as well as all reason and rationality is fully and inherently embodied, 2) the large majority of human thought is unconscious and 3) abstract concepts are for the most part metaphorical rather than literal that most of our ideas concerning metaphysics, epistemology, mind, language, ethics, etc. are based in an incorrect foundation. While I plan to dedicate a number of posts to considering these bold assertions in more detail, in this post I plan to outline the basic approach which the authors take through out the book.

Turing Machines

The purpose of this paper will be to describe the nature and function of Turing Machines as well as the account of mental and physical states which such a machine is supposed to provide. We will then use this account to demonstrate how it is that a Turing Machine is an instance of a Functionalist account of the mind.

Cartesian Dualism (Again)

In this paper the basic tenets of and well as motivations for Cartesian Dualism will be outlined in some detail, after which the problems of mind/body interaction which arise from such a view will be considered. Accordingly, we will explore some of the ways in which some philosophers have attempted to avoid these problems while retaining a dualistic metaphysics. In the end it will become clear why it is that none of these attempts have met with any significant amount of success.