Logical Positivism, Existentialism and Axiology

Values may be, hypothetically speaking, subjective, relative or objective, meaning that they can apply to particular individuals, people within particular situations or contexts, or to everybody everywhere. It is my contention that absolute objectivity in value is in contradiction with any naturalistic worldview, for there is no such thing as intrinsic value, but only relational, or even self-relational value. The purpose of this post will be to illustrate how the philosophical movements of logical positivism and existentialism both lead to a rejection of objective value. It will also be argued, however, that the subjectivism which each movement concludes with is almost, if not just as implausible.

A Defense of Methodological Anti-Naturalism

The naturalistic approach to social science follows very much in the tradition of logical positivism and its application in the natural sciences. It asserts that a scientific account of social facts must be in terms of purposeless mechanism and reduction, non-teleological laws and publicly observable data. Matters such as meaning, purpose or interpretation are entirely antithetical to the scientific endeavor by such a view, for it was by ridding itself of such things that science made so much progress in the natural sciences. Inasmuch as a school of thought appeals to such entities, it is not a science at all. Consequently, it is argued, social science should isolate itself from such matters.