The Flying Spaghetti Monster and Presumption

In a recent episode of South Park Richard Dawkins is portrayed as asking Ms. Garrison why she believes in God. She responds by saying that science is simply unable to prove that God does not exist. Dawkins, in turn, asks if she would believe in a flying spaghetti monster (FSM) simply because science was unable to prove that it did not exist. Ms. Garrison cries in jubilation “You’re right! God is a spaghetti monster!” In this post I wish to examine the FSM argument in greater detail as well as its relation to presumption and the burden of proof.

The (In)Corrigibility of the Phenomenal

As we saw in the last post, in the first chapter of his book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature Rorty argues that the common feature which unites all mental objects is the lack of any appearance/reality distinction. This, he suggests, is the only suitable answer to the question of how we can tell the difference between our having two ways of describing the same thing (monism) versus having two ways of describing two different things (dualism). Supposedly, we can be mistaken regarding physical properties but not phenomenal properties. Furthermore, feelings are exhausted by their phenomenal properties. Consequently, feelings do not have any physical properties and thus cannot be physical substances either.

The Intentional, the Phenomenal and the Mental

During this winter break I have set the goal for myself of reading through Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature as well as Gracia’s Metaphysics and its Task.  In this post I would like to briefly review Rorty’s interesting argument against dualism which he provides in the first chapter of his book.

Referential Use and Speaker’s Reference

The purpose of this paper will be to critically evaluate Donnellan’s assertion that the referential use of definite descriptions is “merely one tool for doing a certain job – calling attention to a person or thing.” (Ostertag, p.176)  In order to do this I will first describe the referential use of language after which I will explore a number of variables which possibly contribute to the unique reference of a definite description.  I will then contrast this account with Kripke’s account of speaker reference.  In conclusion, I will argue that Donnellan’s account of referential use is superior to Kripke’s account of speaker’s reference, since it does not conflict with many of the intuitions with the latter does.

Against Reductionism

In this post I will describe the essential differences between aggregative and non-aggregative social facts.  I will also argue that the latter cannot be reduced to individual facts.

Facts, Values and Post-Modernism

I always have thought that the “self-defeater” response to radical skepticism was a bit of a cheap and easy cop-out.  Just because a person claims that they do not know anything about the world does not entail that they claim to know for sure that they do not know anything about the world.  The skeptic is simply not committed to making any affirmative claims about the world at all, contrary to what the “gotcha!” response presupposes.  The same thing can be said for ethical or epistemic relativists; they need not actively affirm that it is a universal fact that all facts and values are native to some limited perspective.  Of course, some “vulgar relativists” do hold this view and such are easily defeated with the “gotcha!” response.  It must be recognized, however, that this response is simply an objection to a person actively assenting to the relativist position; it is not an actual objection to the position itself.

Teleology and Efficiency; Reduction and Elimination

The eliminative materialist holds that intentional content cannot be reduced to non-intentional content.  We cannot reduce beliefs and desires to neurons firing, for neurons firing are not about anything.  As such, they view beliefs and desires to be entities which are native to the rather undisciplined scientific theory of folk psychology.  Folk psychology is the theory which we use to predict and interact with our social environment by way of viewing people (including ourselves) and their behavior in terms of intentional states such as beliefs and desires. The eliminative materialist thinks that the most responsible position for the scientist to do is eliminate folk psychology along with all belief- and desire-talk, if only out of a commitment to methodological naturalism.  Such entities do not reduce to neural states and as such cannot be part of the naturalistic worldview which sees the entire world as being reducible to matter in motion. 

Laws and Rules

P1        Phenomena which can be studied by the sciences are governed by laws.

P2        Psychological and social phenomena are governed by rules, not laws.

C         Psychological and social phenomena cannot be the subject of scientific study.

Qualia, Causation and Dualism

The 18th British empiricists, Locke, Berkeley and Hume, held that all knowledge of the world could only be acquired by way sense data; nothing could ever be in the intellect which was not first in the senses (except, the rationalists would argue, the intellect itself). Thus, Berkeley argued that the material substance matter was nothing more than a metaphysical hypothesis since we never had sensory access to the actual substance beneath the properties which we observed. Hume took up Berkeley’s torch by arguing that we could never observe causation or necessity in nature either, only the constant conjunction of events. I would argue further, that forces can never be empirically observed either, only the effects which these forces are hypothesized to have upon matter. Finally, I would also argue that, closely related to all these other claims, we can never empirically observe qualia; we can look at neurons, how they are configured and how they are firing as closely and as long as we want but, contrary to other emergent properties in nature, we can never observe the emergence of qualia from brain processes.

Intentionality, Teleology and Causation

I have described in a couple of recent posts the difference between mere behavior or bodily movement and meaningful action. While I have already provided examples of the difference between the two, in this post I wish to discuss the significant differences which underlie the nature of each. I will also demonstrate the logical rather than causal connection which exists between belief/desires and human action. Following such reasoning, I will conclude that human action is necessarily intentional as well as teleological and as such can never be a part of a naturalistic approach to social science, not only in practice, but even in principle.