I have described in a couple of recent posts the difference between mere behavior or bodily movement and meaningful action. While I have already provided examples of the difference between the two, in this post I wish to discuss the significant differences which underlie the nature of each. I will also demonstrate the logical rather than causal connection which exists between belief/desires and human action. Following such reasoning, I will conclude that human action is necessarily intentional as well as teleological and as such can never be a part of a naturalistic approach to social science, not only in practice, but even in principle.
Bodily movement is exclusively matter in motion, explainable entirely in terms of the efficient causes which immediately precede it. There is no mind, meaning, morals or purpose in such a realm; nothing but blind mechanism. Human action, on the other hand, is more or less interpreted bodily movement, behavior made intelligible. In the realm of action mind, meaning, morals and purpose are not only admissible, but are in-expendable. This is because, whereas bodily movement is explainable only in terms of efficient causes, action is explained in terms of reasons. Reasons, roughly, are justifications which consist of beliefs and desires and make any action both intelligible and rational.
If human action is governed by any basic laws or rules, it is this: the rational human being does that action which he/she believes will get him/her what he/she desires in any given context. This law or rule gives us three definitions:
- An action is the interpreted behavior which a rational person believes will fulfill some desire.
- A desire is about that which a rational person believes to be the the end result of some behavior.
- A belief is about that behavior which a rational person should pursue to fulfill some desire.
We should note a number of things about these definitions. First, each one is intentional in nature; there is some sort of representation or interpretation involved in desires, beliefs and actions. Second, each definition is teleological in that the future of an action is, by way of representation, causing the action to happen. Desires are about the future goal, beliefs are about how to reach that future goal and action is interpreted in terms of that future goal.
Given the inescapably intentional and teleological nature of the relationship between beliefs, desires and actions, it seems unlikely that this relationship can be causal in any naturalist sense of the word. First, the idea of backward causation, causes following rather than preceding effects, runs directly counter to the entire naturalist position. It might be objected at this point that in such cases the future is not really causally influencing its past, but rather a past representation of the future is causally influencing the present. After all, why cannot teleological causation in such cases be harmonized, by way of reduction, with efficient causation as has been done in biology by way of Darwin? This topic will be dealt with in greater detail in a future post. For the time being, I will remark that such a project is not only highly unlikely in practice, but also runs up against the second problem.
The second problem is this: it is unclear how matter in motion could ever be about anything at all, thus raising the problem of how mental entities can causally interact with material entities. Causal interaction among beliefs about the past and the present body seem no less problematic than do beliefs about future and the present body. This problem has been approached by some with an attempt to equate the mind with some aspect or activity within the brain, thereby equating beliefs with some process among neurons. The problem, however, is that it seems impossible, even in principle, for neurons, no matter what they are doing, can physically be about the past, present or future. Even if the mind is the body, it still remains unclear how the body/mind could ever be about something. Perhaps the best approach for the physicalist is not to suggest causal interaction between beliefs and body, but rather to suggest that beliefs are how we (somehow!) interpret or construe the causal interaction of matter both inside and outside the body.
Rather than suggest that the relationship among beliefs, desires and actions is causal in nature, we have good reason to believe that it is conceptual or logical in nature. Desires and beliefs do not cause actions, but rather conceptually define them. Desires, beliefs and actions are all ways in which we (somehow!) interpret or construe the causal interactions which are really taking place, causal interactions of which we usually know very little.
Such a view of beliefs, desires and actions has problematic consequences for any kind of reductive behaviorism which attempts to equate mental states, such as beliefs and desires, with their corresponding behavior. The first problem is the that of identifying whether some set of behaviors actually does correspond to a particular belief or desire since the only thing which is publicly available is behavior (which is not even action!). We can only define beliefs by holding both action as well as desire constant, just as we can only define desires by holding both action as well as beliefs constant or define action by holding both desires and beliefs constant. We have no way of assuring that we really are holding such things constant, and it is possible that any number of belief/desire combinations are causing some behavior. Indeed, we cannot even be sure that we are holding such things constant in our own minds due to the holistic nature of beliefs and desires as well non-transparency of the mind.
The second problem of accurately reducing beliefs and desires to behavior is that we have no reason to assume that beliefs and desires are themselves discreet enough so as to lend itself to such accuracy. Beliefs and desires, the eliminative materialist right asserts, are simply theoretical entities, useful fictions for interacting with our social environments. To assume that such things are individuated, discreet and refined enough within a particular individual, let alone across multiple individuals seems to be little more than wishful thinking. The naturalism, inasmuch as it embraces a reduction rather than an elimination of beliefs, desires and actions, seems to be scientific dead end.
