In a recent episode of South Park Richard Dawkins is portrayed as asking Ms. Garrison why she believes in God. She responds by saying that science is simply unable to prove that God does not exist. Dawkins, in turn, asks if she would believe in a flying spaghetti monster (FSM) simply because science was unable to prove that it did not exist. Ms. Garrison cries in jubilation “You’re right! God is a spaghetti monster!” In this post I wish to examine the FSM argument in greater detail as well as its relation to presumption and the burden of proof.
The first thing to get out of the way is that, with all due respect to Ms. Garrison, nobody is seriously calling God a FSM just as Bertrand Russell never called God a cosmic teapot. No comparison between God and FSM is being made by the cynic at all. Rather a comparison is being drawn between a particular argument for God and the exact same argument when employed for FSM. The point which the atheist is trying to make is that the same argument cannot be good when employed for one thing (God) while at the same time being bad when employed for another thing (FSM). What is good for the goose is supposed to be good for the gander as well.
The problem, however, is properly identifying what argument we are talking about here. “Science is unable to prove that X does not exist” can be employed in a number of different ways:
1. X exists because science in unable to prove that X does not exist.
2. We should believe that X exists because science in unable to prove that X does not exist.
3. It is still possible that X exists because science is unable to prove that X does not exist.
4. It is still possible to believe that X exists because science in unable to prove that X does not exist.
There are two subtle but important differences at play in each of these readings. First, whereas (1) and (3) are arguments for the existence of X, (2) and (4) are arguments for our belief in the existence of X. This is significant, for in the later cases pragmatic justifications can, and probably should play some role, while the former cases are limited to epistemic justifications only. In other words, justifications for (1) and (3) are only valid inasmuch as they demonstrate the existence of X. In the case of (2) and (4), however, justifications are valid inasmuch as they demonstrate that it is good to believe in the existence of X. It is important to keep the two different claims from running together, especially in the case of religious debate, for Pascal and James both exploited this difference to argue not for God’s existence, but for the belief in God’s existence. In fact, while Daniel Dennett is absolutely convinced that there is no God, he is quite open to the idea that at least some people should believe in Him nonetheless, maybe. The difference between these two beliefs will play a relatively minor role in this post however.
The second subtle but important difference can be found in the placement of presumption and the burden of proof. (1) and (2) do not assume that X exists or that we should believe that X exists in the absence of the argument which each provides. The person who uses (1) and (2) has tacitly accepted the burden of proof and is attempting to meet that burden by offering (1) and/or (2) as arguments. In the case of (3) and (4), however, the person has assumed presumption in the matter, thereby placing the burden of proof on the scientist and/or interlocutor. (3) and (4) presuppose that we have always thought that X exists or that we should believe that X exists, and that science is unable to refute such positions. In other words, (3) and (4) seem to presuppose that we have other reasons for the beliefs in question.
Before considering the case of X = ‘God’, let us first consider that of X = ‘FSM’. Science’s inability to prove that FSM does not exist clearly gives us no reason to think that FSM exists or that we should think that FSM exists. It is for this reason that we do not believe in the existence of pretty much all things which we think do not exist. However, (3) does seem like a perfectly acceptable argument; it just happens that we can’t think of any reason why we should think that FSM exists in the first place. The same can be said for (4); it is still possible to believe that FSM exists, but we can think of no reason why we should hold such a belief in the first place. After all, it is still possible that an infinitely many things of varying absurdity exist, just as it is possible for one to believe that such things exist; but why FSM of all these things? In other words, while (3) and (4) are valid arguments, we rightfully ask, “By what right does the Pastafarian assume presumption in the matter?” thereby placing the burden of proof upon the Pastafarian where it rightfully belongs.
Now if the atheist is right in his claim that what is good for the goose is also good for the gander, then our analysis of X = ‘God’ should parallel that of X = ‘FSM’. (1) is clearly absurd, for the inabilities of science do not prove the existence of any entity, God included. (2) is equally absurd, for the inabilities of science do not in themselves give us reason to think that a belief in the existence of God is good for us in any way either. (3) and (4) are indeed perfectly good arguments for it is still possible that anything which has not been proven to not exist exists nonetheless. The question, however, is “By what right does the theist assume presumption in the matter?” We simply cannot allow the theist to always place the burden of proof elsewhere.
This is exactly where the atheist wanted as well as expected the discussion to both lead and end. If the theist can only justify their belief by pointing to the invulnerability of the belief to falsification then they have tacitly admitted that they have no affirmative claims by which to justify their belief and perhaps their presumption on the matter. It is by merely using the arguments in question that the theist appears to be without justification in these matters.
The theist, however, remains unconvinced. It is possible that the theist can simply have presumption without having to justify it. After all, it is a feature of human existence that we can never call every single thing which we take for granted into question. This is simply the layman’s way of saying that we can never take every single thing to which we grant presumption and place the burden of proof upon it. We simply must take some things for granted in order to get on with our lives, one aspect of which is reasoning and argumentation itself. God’s existence or a belief in God’s existence, according to the theist, is simply one of these things while FSM and the belief in FSM are not.
There is a serious flaw with such a reply though. It is not enough for the theist to point out that it is impossible, in practice or even in principle, for one to call all of their beliefs into question. Rather, it must be demonstrated that there are some particular beliefs which cannot themselves be called into question. Furthermore, it must also be demonstrated that the belief in God is actually one of such beliefs. The theist has done neither of these things and has therefore given us no reason to suspect that his position necessarily carries presumption or that it is any more credible than any other belief which we take for granted.
Additionally, I will argue that not only can the theist’s position carry the burden of proof, but that it actually should carry such a burden for two reasons. First, the place the burden of proof on those who are arguing for the inexistence of anything, especially something so far removed from empirical investigation, is essentially stacking the deck in one’s favor; it is simply a burden which nobody can possibly bear. This reason, however, only serves to place the burden of proof on the theist in the case of (3), for it is still reasonable to think we should believe in God for pragmatic reasons. The second reason, however, works against both (3) and (4). The theist’s position tends to be accompanied by demands or requests of personal, pragmatic sacrifice, and any such position should rightfully bear the burden of proof.
In conclusion, it should be noted that I have not argued against the theist’s position in any way. I have instead argued that the theist should accept the burden of proof, fully allowing for the possibility that such a burden might be met. To argue that the theist should not accept such a burden, however, is to place it beyond the rules of proper argumentation. Such a move is close, if not tantamount to placing the theistic position beyond the rules of reason, a dangerous position indeed.
Thanks for this article.
If God is the same sort of thing as ‘reason’ or the laws of physics, then it/he/she is just something we take for “granted in order to get on with our lives.”
You say “t[o] place the burden of proof on those who are arguing for the inexistence of anything, especially something so far removed from empirical investigation, is essentially stacking the deck in one’s favor; it is simply a burden which nobody can possibly bear.” I could argue for the inexistence of reason and the laws of physics which can’t be investigated empirically. Would I be required to bear an unbearable burden?
Comment by Will — December 30, 2006 @ 2:24 am
There is a major difference between the laws of physics and reason.
For starters, the laws of physics do lend themselves to empirical investigation. That is what physics is. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that we take the laws of physics for granted at all. Indeed, the task of physics is to call into question those beliefs which we take for granted about the laws of physics.
As for “reason”, this is not a move which the theist should want to make at all, for reason is something which humans construct. If there were no humans, or thinking minds rather, then there would be no such thing as “reason.” Is this really what a theist wants to say about God as well? Indeed, what they argue is that God created all other minds and humans, whereas it is the exact opposite for reason.
Comment by Jeff G — December 30, 2006 @ 11:18 am
The notion of ‘proof’ is presupposed here to be something like ‘proof for others’ I think. The kierkegaardian response to precisely this sort of argument (I’m thinking of ‘Fear and Trembling’) would involve accepting “that the theist should accept the burden of proof, fully allowing for the possibility that such a burden might be met” but then deny that such a proof is _for others_. The proof of the ‘existence’ of God becomes, in other words, the proof of the individuals belief in the existence of God, a proof provided to the individual by the individual through the ‘leap of faith’, though an act of faith that is, precisely, beyond reason since it is beyond the ’shared’ or public.
I’m not sure I would in any way agree with Kierkegaards’ position, though it’s an interesting one. It does, as you suggest, place the theistic position ‘beyond reason’ and this is, indeed dangerous but then again we might also think of it this danger as ‘the risk of reason’. If it is not possible for reason itself to be risked then reason seems somehow less useful. I’m half thinking here of a kind of Popperian claim – ie: the thesis ‘reason is the best means for understanding the world’ needs to be capable of being risked, falsified, and the Kierkegaardian response may be an interesting way of suggesting _how_ such a risk might be enacted – the personal leap of faith as a kind of ‘Eddington experiment’.
Hope that’s not too tangential a response…
Comment by Matt Lee — January 4, 2007 @ 4:15 am
Well, I guess there are two different levels at which I am speaking. The first is argumentation and the second is reasoning, which I basically take to be argumentation with oneself since I define argumentation as reason giving. Thus, I do not see reasons as being intrinsically public for some reasons are only shareable with oneself (thought its not terribly easy to come up with examples of such). Since the burden of proof is pretty much defined or rather determined by the arguers audience, I have no problems with the burden of proof differing between arguing and reasoning.
I also worry about Kierkegaard’s leap of faith as being as being “irrational”. While he certainly accepted that reason couldn’t get us to God, why should unreason get us there rather than any where else? Once reason is dropped it just seems like anything goes and we might as well take the leap of faith to anything at all. Thus, I see the leap of faith as being a calculated one to a significant degree and calculation entails reasoning.
Comment by Jeff G — January 4, 2007 @ 10:44 am
OK, I can see that distinction between argumentation and reason I think and so the issue would then be something like ‘what is the burden of proof within personal reasons’, except I think it’s more a burden of choice. why choose one thing rather than another? this seems to be the question underlying the problem of ‘anything goes and we might as well take the leap of faith to anything at all’. at this point, the argument goes, the issue shifts to values. the burden of choice will be resolved by the values underlying the choice process. at least this would, I think, be the sort of ‘existentialist’ route Kierkegaard might take. the whole nature of ‘normative’ structures then come in. for example, to the question, ‘why value X’, it seems unlikely we can always answer ‘because of reason Y’ and this not just in a kind of Kantian way (the value of free will etc) but also because of the argument that values are naturalistically necessary. an account, for example, of ‘emotional intelligence’ might posit the necessity of the values and suggest that the examples of people with damaged amygdala’s or frontal lobes indicate the intimate necessity of values over and above reasons. take the case of when there are conflicting but equally good reasons for different courses of actions – if a decision is necessary then this posits a necessary structure underlying decisions that is not part of reason and instead looks like an underlying value assigment structure. the choice then is not capable of doing anything other than revealing post-facto, the values that underly, values which may *then* be susceptible to rationally (argumentative) level intervention. values (or the assignment of particular weights to variables) seem like something learnt through culture and may perhaps even be major purpose of culture.
it is a peculiar argument though, one that seems to reverse the normal course of things in terms of deciding on the reasons ‘for’ something when it comes to an action. perhaps there’s something important in the difference between reasons for actions and reasons for theses/claims that gets tangled in theistic arguments where ‘belief’ can be taken as either an action or a claim it seems.
Comment by Matt Lee — January 4, 2007 @ 2:17 pm
“the burden of choice will be resolved by the values underlying the choice process.”
I don’t see how this is anything less than reasoning. Nobody is really asking the religionist to provide proof by way of reason any more, only to provide good, solid reasons by which choices can be made. If we can’t ask for conclusive reasons, we should at least be able to ask for compelling reasons, right? But religionists seem unable to give even compelling reasons for such a choice when discussing things in the public sphere. (Again, the difference in audience is playing a large role here.)
Comment by Jeff G — January 5, 2007 @ 3:56 pm
So, I have to be real honest again. I did not follow everything in this post but I found it very interesting.
You talk about “the rules of reason.” Do you feel that reason is capable of ascertaining all that is?
You talk about “burden of proof” and I agree that Garrison’s reason for believing in God is silly, but, is the word “proof” applicable to God?
Thanks!
Comment by amandalaine — March 13, 2007 @ 11:57 am
Of course I’m not so naive as to think that reason is all powerful, but I do think that its pretty much the best (only?) tool we have in these matters. Reason (epistemic or pragmatic) trumps all.
The burden of proof should not be taken as being something too far fetched. I simply mean that the burden is on the religionist to give me a reason to believe what they do. It is my position that they cannot even do this.
Comment by Jeff G — March 13, 2007 @ 12:34 pm
Cool. I appreciate your answer.
Reason is a prime tool. However, we make a boatload of assumptions on a regular basis. (You pointed this out when you said we can’t test all propositions. But – and this is the key – we act anyway.) I have to say the one thing I disagree with you on is “Reason … trumps all.” Some things are far from reasonable but they occur. I suppose an example would be good at this point…
Anyway, if I had a better grasp on the concepts in your post, I might try giving your a reason for the faith I have. But, to be quite honest, I don’t think faith, or religion, is wholly rational. It starts out with the unexplainable and ends with that. Reason works in the meantime (theology and apologetics) but it’s ultimately unreasonable in the sense that it’s beyond human reason. What do you think of that?
Comment by amandalaine — March 13, 2007 @ 12:47 pm
To say that religion is beyond reason is a VERY dangerous move. It pretty much makes all arguments both for and against religion work by turning religious discourse into nothing more than sound and fury. To talk about anything presupposed at least SOME rationality or reason otherwise we are left with utter chaos. Let me give an example: “There never was any Jesus. (What is your justification?) Justification? Why should I? My claim is beyond reason, but true nonetheless.” In other words, the beyond reason reply is far too cheap because anybody can use it whenever they get into epistemic problems.
TO be clear, I’m not against religion per se. People can hope for whatever they want. Indeed, I hope that there is an afterlife too. There just doesn’t seem to be any support whatsoever for such a hope, making it an unjustified principle to live my life by.
Let me get back to my hope about an afterlife. It is at this point that the religionist tells me that I should live my life as if there was one. In other words, I don’t think that there are religions out there that don’t require some sacrifice or another in the name of the religion. Inasmuch as there are, they fall beyond this particular criticism but at the price of making themselves entirely trivial, and hardly worth notice.
To say that somebody should sacrifice anything without any reason whatsoever is inexcusable. But then, I don’t see religion as actually doing this. Religions do provide reasons for why sacrifices should be made. They just aren’t good reasons at all.
I should also point out that it is a rare occasion when the religionist is willing to tolerate the “beyond reason” reply in other religions.
Comment by Jeff G — March 13, 2007 @ 1:07 pm
You said “I’m not so naive as to think that reason is all powerful”. This is an admission of its limitations. And yet, we don’t understand many things but they exist anyway. So, as best as I can tell, you have agreed that some things exist that are currently beyond our reason. What this then means is that we live in a world that we perceive through both reason and… what? Assumption? Faith? Surely we do not have the time to test all propositions, as you already stated. And yet we do not have the ability not to act. So, to some degree, we act on faith all the time. And reason is inescapable. In fact it was reason that told me I was acting on faith. Here is my argument: reason and faith act together all the time. Can I explain it fully? No. We don’t live in a world fully accessible to our senses and reason. As you said, our reason is limited. But, from my viewpoint, it is reason that says there is limit to what reason can do. To which you agreed.
So, do I “say that religion is beyond reason”? No. I asolutely do not!! I could not agree with you more. You have summed up my beliefs well (on the worth of reason). But I also agree with you that reason has its limitations. That was my point. It is both/and not one or the other. Wouldn’t you agree that all reasoning is based on a few assumptions? Therefore all reasoning is based on some level of faith? Therefore faith – in its most general form – is the foundation of reason? You can’t get behind consciousness. (This is your area of expertise isn’t it? Perhaps I shouldn’t be talking about consciousness…)
So, again, I agree with you. Reason teaches us much. I think it also teaches us that it has limitations. Enter faith.
I will stop. I would love to hear what you have to say about that. My thoughts are not fully formed. Thank you again for your response!
Comment by amandalaine — March 13, 2007 @ 1:28 pm
Did you give up on me?
I am very interested in whatever you’ve got to say in response. Thank you.
Comment by amandalaine — March 13, 2007 @ 4:43 pm
I’m not sure you care, but I found this very interesting. The title of this post is: “Acts of Faith are, strictly speaking, Irrational” It’s in line with our previous conversation.
http://trentage.blogspot.com/2006/01/acts-of-faith-are-strictly-speaking.html
I’ll quit posting. Thank you for your thoughts!
Comment by amandalaine — March 13, 2007 @ 7:33 pm
Sorry about the absence. I had class among other things, so don’t be scared away.
I would certainly grant that all reasoning is based in assumptions. However, religious beliefs do not constitute any of these assumptions. The big problem with religion is not that we are assuming some things (which of course is inevitable) but that the religionists is placing these particular assumptions beyond questioning of any kind. Furthermore, these assumptions are about the existence of things such as agents, places/states, etc.
“some things exist that are currently beyond our reason. What this then means is that we live in a world that we perceive through both reason and… what? Assumption? Faith?”
I agree with the first statement. The second claim, however, seems like a complete non-sequiter. If we can’t justify our beliefs in something through reasoning (broadly construed) the proper claim is not that we use something else to justify such beliefs, but rather than such beliefs are unjustified. By what criteria do we accept religious beliefs while rejecting others which are just as unjustified?
The claim that religion is not based in reason seems to amount to two different things: 1) We are raised into a religion not by way of rational argument, but by way of taking it for granted as we do other cultural beliefs. 2) Religious beliefs cannot be justified by way of rational argument, but beyond rational argument in the sense of being immune to such considerations.
(2) can be used to save any belief which does not fare well against rational argument including the belief in Santa Claus. (1) has absolutely nothing to do with the justifiability of some belief, for a belief in Santa Claus is also beyond reason in this aspect. Either way, there seems to be no way for the religionist to claim religious beliefs to be beyond reason in a sense which Santa is not.
Comment by Jeff G — March 14, 2007 @ 12:02 am
Well, I will respond again later when I have more time. But, first, I did not claim that “religion is not based in reason”. If I did, I am sorry for the miscommunication. What I have been attempting to claim is religion is not WHOLLY based in reason.
Comment by amandalaine — March 14, 2007 @ 12:55 pm
“the religionists is placing these particular assumptions beyond questioning of any kind.” I will speak for myself here as I don’t represent all people “of faith.” I have not placed my faith-based positions beyond question, BUT, I have put faith in them. I question, regularly, the existence of God and the ludicrous claim that He wrote a book through men (the Bible). What faith means is that I have chosen to believe despite lacking full evidence. I haven’t stopped asking questions. I am not stopping you or
anyone else from asking questions. Questions are good! Questions reveal exactly how much faith is involved. Faith must be seen for what it is – somewhat irrational.
My further claim is that we live in a world that demands “somewhat irrational” positions. This is the natural result of not having all information and of developing over time (the fact that we learn). Another way of putting this is that I am unquestionably finite. Finity forces faith. You don’t actually know that your reason is efficacious, but we all believe it. We must. No one knows what intelligent person will, tomorrow, put a whole in the argument that today you staked your life on. It can not be predicted. But you believe anyway.
And, my most important claim, is that all positions on ultimate matters are based on faith and reason. I never said that the religion I subscribe to is based wholly on faith. It is not! I would not be able to have this conversation with you otherwise. It is the result of reason and of faith. Which is, again, the case for all positions on ultimate matters, whether religious or irreligious.
I look forward to hearing your response!
(By the way, I recognize I am not dealing directly with the original topic you posted on. I am sorry about that. Hope that’s ok… this is kind of a big rabbit trail.)
Comment by amandalaine — March 14, 2007 @ 7:44 pm
Getting back to your original topic, I am not familiar enough with the arguments to truly provide anything beneficial. But, here’s a link to an answer to your above claims. http://maverickphilosopher.powerblogs.com/posts/1169851433.shtml
Comment by amandalaine — March 15, 2007 @ 5:13 am
Do you think a more sophisticated case (such as Plantinga’s Proper Basicality) of belief in God is different from the one presented in the Spaghetti Monster scenario.
I personally feel that the teapot and spaghetti monster are gross examples of the straw man in action.
Comment by Brad — March 15, 2007 @ 9:15 am
[...] suggested I raise this topic; so, I am. Many good posts on other blogs explore the FSM. Minds, Meaning and Morals The Alanyzer Maverick [...]
Pingback by The Flying Spaghetti Monster Flys Again! « The Unnamable Blog — March 16, 2007 @ 2:35 pm
I’m back. Still very curious to hear your response to my previous thoughts.
I’ve been reading your post more carefully. (It takes me a while.)
“We simply must take some things for granted… God’s existence or a belief in God’s existence, according to the theist, is simply one of these things while FSM and the belief in FSM are not.”
I can not speak for all theists but I can speak for myself. I definitely do not agree with that. I think it is something that should be considered because, obviously, it is the very key and foundation of the whole matter. It is more than stupid not to think about it. However, what is necessary to say is that it can’t be proved one way or the other. From a perspective, this is complete speculation because God has been defined as something transcendent therefore completely removed from human grasp. So, yes it should be questioned, but, no, it can not be proven one way or the other. Such is the case with being finite. This conclusion would be true of many things, not just God. I can not verify the reasonableness of my reason; no one can. I can not, and do not, verify most things in my life. I literally walk by faith most of the time because I am literally not capable of testing most things. This applies to all human beings. We have just enough reason to know we are incredibly dependent on other things. (I.e. I am no better than the information given to me and on my own capacity to reason.)
Your burden of proof idea- I can see what you’re saying. However, “burden of proof” seems dependent on one thing: knowing which side is least likely. And that of course is what the argument is all about. If I have to know that, before starting the argument, the argument can never be had. If I think it is more likely that God does not exist, then theists have the least likely position so the burden of proof rests on them. And vice versa. In a situation in which empirical evidence is, by definition, completely unreachable, no burden of proof can truly be established.
What do you think of that? Sorry if I’m drawing this conversation out too long. I’m still very curious.
Comment by amandalaine — March 17, 2007 @ 3:28 pm
I fully plan on engaging you. The problem is that I have A LOT of work to do for the next few days. By Wednesday or Thursday, however, I’ll definitely take the time to respond. I know its inconvenient, but I gotta keep the priorities straight.
Comment by Jeff G — March 17, 2007 @ 9:29 pm
Hey, that’s totally cool. Thanks for your explanation! My spring break just started this week, so I’m off from school.
What are you studying? Some form of philosophy?
Good luck with your work!
Comment by amandalaine — March 18, 2007 @ 4:10 pm
Alright, I finally have a little bit of time. In your comments you make quite a few claims which I’m not entirely comfortable with, if only because I’m either not sure what they amount to, or I’m not sure what role they are playing in your argument. I’ll try to address them one by one:
1) What faith means is that I have chosen to believe despite lacking full evidence.
I always get worried when people start dropping the “F bomb” (faith) because it can mean almost anything. If we are just talking about belief, then lets use that word instead. If you are talking about something more than that, then lets get the exact meaning nailed down. I suspect, though, that you simply mean belief
2) Faith must be seen for what it is – somewhat irrational.
Again, I’m not sure what you mean by “irrational.” If you simply mean “less than certain”, or “not deductive in nature” then I agree with you, but such a point seems rather trivial. One can be quite rational without being absolutely certain or being deductive in one’s logic. By rational, I simply mean obeying the rules of proper belief and argumentation. A belief is rational if one is sufficiently justified in believing it by reasons, evidence, pragmatic value, etc. To be irrational is to go against such things.
3) My further claim is that we live in a world that demands “somewhat irrational” positions.
Same thing as above. I don’t think that the world demands us to make irrational moves as I have defined the world, especially in cases where we get to take our time and evaluate a claim such as God’s existence.
4) all positions on ultimate matters are based on faith and reason.
I’m not sure what you mean by “ultimate matters”. It seems like this phrase is loaded in the theist’s favor. What, exactly, are the ultimate matters for an atheist? Whatever they are, they certainly seem to lend themselves to rational evaluation as I have defined it.
5) However, what is necessary to say is that it can’t be proved one way or the other.
I’m not sure what you are getting at in this part of your comment. It seems like a sentence accidentally got deleted or something perhaps? How is “it can’t be proved one way or the other” different in the case of God than it is in the case of the FSM?
6) I can not verify the reasonableness of my reason; no one can. I can not, and do not, verify most things in my life.
With this I must disagree. You may not be able to verify whether your belief is true or not, but you can certainly evaluate how reasonable your belief is. This is pretty much all we can ever do, and I see no reason why the belief in God is not on all fours with every other belief in this matter.
7) However, “burden of proof” seems dependent on one thing: knowing which side is least likely.
I don’t agree with this either. The burden of proof is simply the opposite of presumption. Presumption is simply being the default position. When it comes to existence claims we simply cannot give the affirmative side presumption, otherwise we would literally believe almost everything. This is what I take the FSM to illustrate: that all arguments aside, and I mean ALL arguments, we start off with a disbelief in the existence of everything. Now, from this point we can begin to consider arguments for or against the possible existence of something. Now I certainly allow that some argument for God’s existence might be good, I just haven’t heard it yet. Furthermore, I fully acknowledge that pragmatic arguments might work quite well for people other than me. Nevertheless, I see the burden of proof, which I take the theist to bear, as not having been met.
I’m not sure that this is really a path which you should want to take. Either God is relevant to this world or He is not. If He is, then should be make some empirical difference which should, in principle at least, be verifiable. If He is not, then why should I care about whether He exists or not? Perhaps you will appeal to the next life, but how do we know about the next life if not by way of God’s interacting with the world?
Comment by Jeff G — March 21, 2007 @ 9:39 pm
Thanks! Excellent points! You are totally right in saying I left many words undefined. That’s a problem. I was noticing the vagueness of my sentences but left them go. I will go back and answer each of your points (on clarity) when I get time.
Regarding your other points – in which the problem was not just my lack of clarity – I will get back to those also.
Good thoughts! I really appreciate you taking the time to engage me. I’ll be back.
Comment by amandalaine — March 22, 2007 @ 6:41 am
I’m back. And this is very long, sorry.
Unfortunately, I am not near as adept as you at articulating these abstract concepts. Hopefully this post is clearer.
1) I looked up both words, faith and belief, and they are actually used as synonyms for each other. So, according to the dictionary, the central idea is the same. Again, here’s what I mean when I say the word faith: taking a position for which you do not have complete evidence. That’s all. Now, obviously, the word faith has very religious connotations; like most words, it can be used various ways. The definition I gave is the most general and is what I mean when I use the word.
2) We agree on this. I was referring to what is “less than certain” or “not deductive in nature.” And yes, I was referring to this as irrational. However, I do not agree that this is trivial. It is huge to be uncertain. If the foundations for what I believe, or have faith in, are uncertain, everything is uncertain. That is why I harp on the faith thing – it applies to all people and demonstrates how incomplete we are on our own. (This is not a hidden argument for God. You could apply this to our need for “relationship” with the universe, instead of God. Basically, if I did not create myself I am dependent on something – either matter or non-matter.)
Another thing I disagree with is the ease with which you state the following: “By rational, I simply mean obeying the rules of proper belief and argumentation.” Is it really that easy? Are all people rational? If so, why do we not agree? The definition of rational is easy to state – here, you and I completely agree – but I completely disagree with you in your implication that it is easy to apply rationality or agree on exactly what rationality looks like. What would “sufficiently justified” look like? This is very difficult.
My point? Faith really is somewhat irrational in the sense that it is less than certain. And, second, when it comes to “ultimate matters” (defined below), it can be difficult to say what is rational. (Although, it must be attempted.)
3) Refer to 2.
4) By ultimate matters I meant meaning, purpose, origin, destiny, the nature of truth, God, most metaphysical concepts – things like that. Of course you can deny that all those things exist. Loaded in the theists favor? I hadn’t thought of that. From my perspective, most of the above concepts apply to a theist and atheist equally. What do you think? I hope I am not being unfair to atheists in any of my comments.
5) What am I getting at? Nothing more than we are forced to faith, i.e. taking a position when we are less than certain. How is this different than the FSM argument? Easy. I am not claiming that this is any GOOD reason to believe in God (while Mrs. Garrison does). It’s not; it’s a terrible reason. It’s just one of many factors (i.e. faith) that enters a discussion such as ours.
6) Of all things, I thought for sure we’d be exactly on the same page as this one. I assumed everyone agreed on this point. Perhaps I was unclear in what I was saying. I am not talking about verifying ANY belief except one: the belief in the efficaciousness of reason. That can not be verified, right? How can I prove reason by reason? This is circular reasoning. The moment you start to argue is the moment you’ve assumed your mind is capable of “getting anywhere,” i.e. that it is actually trustworthy. This is unavoidable but key. So, we apply reason to ALL things. Except reason itself. Are you familiar with this argument? I assumed everyone knew. It is possible I am a terrible communicator and you thought I was talking about something else.
Yes, reason should be applied to God. If you see no reason for believing in Him, don’t believe in Him.
7) So, I can absolutely see what you’re saying here. I am not familiar enough with the “God’s existence” debate to respond with anything substantive here. Sorry. Perhaps you are right (about the burden of proof)! I am not sure.
Thanks for your thoughts! Sorry soooooooo long. I really enjoy hearing what you have to say since we come from two totally different ideas. You’re helping me think.
Comment by amandalaine — March 28, 2007 @ 7:40 pm