In his paper “The Case for Animal Rights” Tom Regan argues from a roughly Kantian perspective that animals have intrinsic value equal to that of humans and as such should cease to be used as mere resources for others. In this paper, I will detail both Regan’s position as well as the argument which he mounts in its favor. It will be shown that though his argument is valid, it is not sound, being based on a number of unacceptable premises. Whether attempts at replacing the unacceptable premises with more appropriate ones provide a legitimate defense of animal rights or not is left as an open question.
· An Outline of Regan’s Argument
Regan’s is an unabashed appeal to reason, for according to him reason dictates the “total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture” along with all other institutions and practices which treat animals as mere means to our ends. (p. 196) In order to demonstrate this, Regan first argues that we do, in some sense, have some direct duties toward animals. This argument will not be discussed in this paper. Regan then proceeds to demonstrate that Kantian, as opposed to Utilitarian ethics provides the more compelling account of morality for humans. This argument will also not be addressed in this paper.
Where we will engage Regan is in the third and most crucial point which he attempts to make, namely that animals should (pace the anthropocentric Kant!) be included within this Kantian account of morality. Having concluded that the Kantian account of morality is the most rational one, he argues that the scope of such an account cannot be limited to humans in any rationally defensible manner. Indeed, once we understand the reason for which we extend intrinsic value to all humans, we will be rationally compelled to extend intrinsic value to many non-human animals as well.
· The Intrinsic Value of Humans
Let us examine the structure of this argument in more detail. The first part of Regan’s two-part argument is concerned with describing Kantian ethics as it applies to humans:
(1) All humans have intrinsic value.
(2) All those who have intrinsic value have it equally.
(3) All and only those which have some relevant property, X, have intrinsic value.
(4) Any property, Y, which is not common to all humans is not X. (1, 3)
One is tempted to immediately reject premise (2) for surely we do not grant equal intrinsic value or equal rights to all humans. It is not at all obvious that we grant such things to minors, the mentally challenged, criminals or the comatose. This, however, is to misunderstand what Regan means by intrinsic value. To have intrinsic value is for an individual to not have the status of a thing which exists as a mere resource for others. (p. 200) Surely all humans have intrinsic value in this sense of the term, for it would be unthinkable for us to farm or experiment on minors, etc.
The third premise is meant to convey the idea that there is some property in virtue of which some things have intrinsic value while others do not. Put another way, intrinsic value can be said to supervene upon some property, X, or that this property grounds intrinsic value. Kant, for example, held that humans and humans alone had intrinsic value in virtue of their having the properties of reason, autonomy and intellect. Regan, we will soon see, will argue against such an anthropocentric account. While Regan disagrees with Kant’s particular choice in X, he agrees that there must be some X which does in fact ground intrinsic value; it just happens that X is not reason, autonomy or intellect.
There is two criteria which any X must meet in order to adequately ground intrinsic value, the first of which is relevance. Regan suggests that whatever similarity it is that grounds intrinsic value in all humans, it should be “crucial” and “basic”. This criterion serves to block any attempts at grounding intrinsic value in properties which have little, if any, relevance to it. Thus, the property of belonging to one particular species rather than another is disqualified, for such a thing seems entirely irrelevant to the grounding of intrinsic value. While all members of some species might have some property, X, which does in fact ground their intrinsic value, it is X which we thus are interested in, not that of belonging to the species which instantiates X.
Given that all humans have intrinsic value, and given that there must be some relevant property in virtue of which all humans have intrinsic value, it must be concluded that whatever X turns out to be, it must be instantiated by all humans. This is the second criterion which any suitable X must meet. If some property, Y, is not instantiated by all humans then to assign intrinsic value according Y is a form of discrimination and is, therefore, immoral. A long list of Y’s, which have at some time (incorrectly) been taken by some to be X, comes easily to mind: sex, religion, race, bloodline, age and, most importantly, reason, autonomy and intellect. All humans have intrinsic value, but none of these properties are instantiated by all humans. Consequently, none of these properties can reasonably be said to ground intrinsic value.
One can object that while it is true that not all humans have reason, autonomy or intellect, they potentially have it and this grounds their actual intrinsic value. The response which Regan has ready at hand to this objection, however, is that such people do not actually have intrinsic value. Potentially instantiating X can only ground potential intrinsic value, and some non-actual X can only ground non-actual intrinsic value. This is simply not good enough, for we grant that an infant has actual, not merely potential intrinsic value.
The first half of Regan’s argument seems relatively uncontroversial, which is exactly what he intends. It is because this account of intrinsic value is so uncontroversial in the case of humans that it serves, by way of reason, to extend the same intrinsic value to animals. I will eventually argue, however, that extending the account to include non-humans serves to highlight significant problems with (2) and (3). Before we consider these problems, let us first discuss the second half of Regan’s argument.
· Extending Intrinsic Value to Non-humans
Regan’s argument continues by offering a suitable X which he takes to ground intrinsic value in all humans:
(5) The property of being the “experiencing subject of a life” is the only relevant X which is common to all humans.
(6) All experiencing subjects of a life have equal intrinsic value. (2, 3, 5)
Contrary to Kant, the properties of reason, autonomy and intellect (relevant though they may be) are not common to all humans and thus cannot be taken to ground intrinsic value. There is, however, another property which is relevant as well as common to all humans, and therefore can ground intrinsic value:
“The really crucial, the basic similarity … between those human beings who most clearly, most noncontroversially have [intrinsic] value … is simply this: we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life, each of us a conscious creature having an individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to others.” (p. 200-201)
Being the experiencing subject of a life, according to Regan, is the property which grounds intrinsic value in all humans in virtue of being both relevant and common to all humans. Furthermore, since many non-human animals are also the experiencing subjects of a life as well, they too have intrinsic value equal to that of humans. Consequently, since we would never dream of allowing humans to be treated as mere resources for others due to their intrinsic value, we must similarly refuse to treat these non-human animals as mere resources as well.
· The ‘Humans Without Lives’ Objection
There are two counter-examples which suggest that Regan’s account must be revised, if not rejected altogether. The first counterexample regards those humans which cannot be said to be the experiencing subjects of a life. People who are in comas (be they terminal or not), the recently deceased, unborn children, nor the (hypothetical) cryogenically frozen can be said to actually be experiencing a life and yet they each seem to have some intrinsic value. We would certainly never treat such “people” as mere resources for other. Given that Regan’s proposed X does not satisfy (3) or (4) it would seem, by Regan’s own logic, that we should instead view it as yet another Y.
One is tempted to suggest that such people are the potential experiencing subjects of a life, but such an appeal to potential would undermine the reply which Regan was forced to use against the anthropocentrist in the cases of reason, autonomy and intellect. If potential X’s cannot ground actual intrinsic value, then Regan’s X fails to ground the intrinsic value of some humans. If potential X’s can ground actual intrinsic value then there is no reason why one cannot limit intrinsic value to humans after all. Perhaps Regan can appeal to the past life experienced by the comatose, deceased and cryogenically frozen in order to ground their continued intrinsic value. One wonders, however, why it is possible for the past experiences to ground present intrinsic value when future experiences were unable to do so.
This objection calls (5) into question, which thereby undermines (6) as well. A modified version of Regan’s argument can, however, be salvaged from the ‘humans without lives’ objection:
(7) Any relevant property, Y, which is found only in humans, is not common to all humans.
(8) Any relevant property, Y, which is found only in humans, is not X. (4, 7)
(9) Some non-humans have intrinsic value. (1, 3, 
(10) Some non-humans have intrinsic value equal to that of humans. (2, 9)
The crucial premise in this argument is the claim that any relevant property which is found only in humans, will actually exclude at least some humans as well. It is precisely because this premise holds in the case of reason, autonomy and intellect that Kant’s account fails by Regan’s lights, thereby extending intrinsic value to non-human animals. The new argument suggests that even if Regan’s choice in X no more meets his criteria than does Kant’s, there must still be some X which not only does ground not only the intrinsic value in all humans, but also that of many non-humans. This position, however, is no better than that of the anthropocentrist who maintains that there is some property that all and only humans have which grounds their intrinsic value. Both positions are merely faith statements for or against (7), neither of which compels our rational assent.
Rather than accept either of these positions, a more defensible move, if only for the sake of moving the conversation forward, would be to deny one of the premises on which the argument is being carried out, in this case (3). Rather than that hold that there is a unique property (or set of necessary and sufficient conditions) upon which intrinsic value supervenes, one can appeal to Wittgensteinian family resemblance in holding that intrinsic value supervenes on a cluster of properties, many combinations of which are jointly sufficient to ground intrinsic value but no one of which is individually necessary. What these properties are and which combinations are sufficient to ground what amount of intrinsic value in which individuals are all questions which take us well beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to say that such an account is not compatible with Regan’s argument as he presents it in virtue of its rejection of (3).
· The ‘Jellyfish’ Objection
A second counterexample to Regan’s account is that of those animals, both human and non-human, which cannot be said to clearly experience or not experience a life such as jellyfish, worms, ants, unborn children, etc. Wherever Regan may draw the line between the white of the genuine experiencers and the black of the non-experiencers, it will be a vague and somewhat arbitrary decision, for gray comes in many shades. To hold that each and every individual on the white side has equal intrinsic value while all those which lie on the black side, have none at all seems extreme and untenable. Nevertheless, the (2), on which both (6) and (10) rely, as well as Regan’s definition of intrinsic value, seem to commit him to just such a position. Allowing for degrees of intrinsic value is exactly what Regan is trying to exclude for it allows the anthropocentrist to place the value of animals below that of humans in some way. Regan’s premise (2) necessarily commits him to this seemingly absurd position.
It is worth clarifying what is and is not at stake in this second objection. The criticism is not that we do not know where to draw the line between those things which have intrinsic value and those which do not. Regan rightly notes that he is not committed to knowing any such thing. What Regan is committed to, however, is the existence of a definite line in nature which distinguishes all those which have intrinsic value, fully and equally, from those which do not have it at all. It is this position, one which Regan is committed to, which is coming under fire.
In response, Regan might possibly reply by saying that we do not actually use such borderline animals as resources, thereby making the ‘jellyfish’ objection practically irrelevant. This, however, would be to change the subject entirely. The issue at hand is whether animals have intrinsic value equal to humans or not. Whether we actually violate the intrinsic value of some animal is altogether irrelevant.
It should be noted that this objection works equally well against (10) as it does against (6), for both conclusions are derived from (2) which is being rejected. Regan might object that in rejecting (2) we are thereby denying that all humans have equal intrinsic value. There does not, however, seem to be any contradiction in claiming that this question is also entirely independent of (2). Reason does not compel us to accept that, since all humans have equal intrinsic value, all things that have intrinsic value must have it equally as well.
It is also worth noting that the cluster theory detailed above does not seem committed to such an all or nothing position. Certain combinations of properties may ground more intrinsic value in humans than other combinations do in non-humans. Again, what these properties or combinations of properties are as well as which ones ground Regan’s idea of intrinsic value in which animals are question which fall beyond the scope of this paper.
· Conclusion
Regan argues that the best account of human morality, namely a form of Kantian ethics, also provides compelling reason to grant to all animals which are the experiencing subject of a life intrinsic value equal to that of humans. Such a conclusion, however, suffers from two serious forms of counterexamples which lead one to reject the premises on which Regan bases his argument. Intrinsic value need not be an all or nothing affair nor does it need to be grounded by some property which is instantiated in all humans. A better account would likely have intrinsic value supervening upon clusters of properties which are jointly sufficient, but not individually necessary, to ground intrinsic value.
Bibliography:
Regan, Tom “The Case for Animal Rights” reprinted in Environmental Ethics: Concepts, Policy, Theory ed. Joseph DesJardins (1999)
