The Chinese Room and Chinese Robot as Distinct Thought Experiments

(This is a third draft of a paper which I am working on for my Philosophy of Consciousness seminar. It is also a paper which I may eventually use for my writing sample, so thoughtful criticisms are greatly appreciated.)

The Chinese Room and the Chinese Robot

as Distinct Thought Experiments

In his seminal paper, “Minds, Brains and Programs,”[1] John Searle noted with seeming amusement that his opponents could not agree on what the proper reply to his Chinese Room thought experiment should be.[2] The objective of this paper will not be to add to the confusion which surrounds Searle’s argument by defending a reply which has already been offered, or, worse still, by providing yet another reply to his argument.  Instead, my primary focus will be to describe where the debate between Searle and his interlocutors has gone astray as well as point out where Searle’s argument is in critical need of clarification.  More to the point, I will argue that both sides of the debate have failed to appreciate, if not recognize that there are two highly distinct thought experiments which are at play throughout Searle’s paper, each aimed at illustrating a very different point.  Once these separate thought experiments, along with their independent conclusions are properly isolated from each other, one can then clearly identify the points of difference between Searle and his opponents as well as the exact point at which each side in the debate begins to speak past the other.

Darwin’s Use of Consilience and Analogy in the Origin of Species

Soon after the publication of Origin of Species, Charles Darwin wrote the following in a letter to Hugh Falconer:

“You were very antagonistic to my views on species.  I well knew this would be the case.  I must freely confess, the difficulties and objections are terrific; but I cannot believe that a false theory would explain, as it seems to me it does explain, so many classes of facts.”[1]

Eliminating P-Consciousness

My Philosophy of Mind professor is apparently in the midst of an eliminativist crisis in terms of phenomenal consciousness.  His argument is basically as follows:  1) There would be absolutely no difference between those individuals which actually have phenomenal consciousness and those individuals who labor under the false belief that they have phenomenal consciousness.  2) Phenomenal consciousness is far more metaphysically strange than is a false-phenomenal-consciousness-belief making mechanism in the brain.  3) Thus, the eliminative position is preferable to the alternative.

Adaptationisms

In his essay “Three Kinds of Adaptationism” Peter Godfrey-Smith argues that the debate surrounding adaptationism actually consists of three distinct and logically independent debates.  In this paper I will consider the three adaptationist positions which Godfrey-Smith sees are at stake in such debates as well as his argument for their logical independence of one another.  I will then argue that Godfrey-Smith’s argument is based in premises which are not accepted by all parties in such debates and thus serves to confuse rather than clarify the issues at hand.   I will then attempt to salvage a modified form of Godfrey-Smith’s argument so as to make it acceptable to all sides of the adaptationism debate and thereby achieve his goal of “classification and clarification.” (Godfrey-Smith, 1)