Comments on: Eliminating P-Consciousness

By: Sam D

Sam D — Fri, 15 Jun 2007 06:20:57 +0000

Is it possible to have the “false belief that they have phenomenal consciousness”?

If only things with phenomenal consciousness can have beliefs, then the answer would have to be No.
I’m inclined to think that zombies don’t have ‘beliefs’ as such, but I could be wrong

So how does something with no phenomenal consciousness have beliefs?

By: Jeff G

Jeff G — Tue, 13 Mar 2007 20:38:43 +0000

I don’t think that either of his premises are all that problematic. As for (1), there is no discernible difference at all. Nobody from the 1st or 3rd person perspective could ever tell the difference between the two positions.

I also fail to see how p-consciousness is NOT metaphysically strange given naturalism. Perhaps I wasn’t terribly clear, but he sees himself as arguing within a purely naturalistic metaphysics and to suggest that there is this special stuff called p-consciousness which matter in motion somehow creates seems utterly mysterious to me. In fact, isn’t the metaphysically mysterious nature of it the whole reason why there is a problem of consciousness at all?

By: Clark

Clark — Tue, 13 Mar 2007 20:00:18 +0000

Yeah “metaphysically strange” seems like one of those annoying appeals to intuition couched in pejorative language.

I also think (1) in his argument is pretty problematic. “No difference” in what sense?

By: Peli Grietzer

Peli Grietzer — Sun, 11 Mar 2007 22:59:06 +0000

Fine points all, but also “metaphysically strange” is a real question-begger, no?

By: Jeff G

Jeff G — Sun, 11 Mar 2007 22:01:37 +0000

How ironic that you praise my clarity in one sentence only to point out a perfect case of unclarity in my writing.

I didn’t mean to imply that all of philosophy is a false-belief maker in any way. Rather, I meant that those philosophers who have drawn a distinction between P-consciousness and A-consciousness are the false-belief makers. To claim that this false-belief is the product of biological innateness would be to endorse a form of innatism which is WAY too strong.

As for the biologically innate false-belief maker, what my prof. says is that the idea of P-consciousness evolved in order to facilitate the emergence of ethical behavior. This is just way too much for me to buy for a number of reasons:

1. It is a blatant just so story.
2. It is a just so story made to account for a trait which we aren’t even sure that we have.
3. It is not at all clear that the trait would be at all helpful in the emergence of ethical behavior.

I imagine that the same criticisms could be brought, to one degree or another, against the idea of a god-gene as well.

By: amandalaine

amandalaine — Sun, 11 Mar 2007 21:43:22 +0000

So, your posts are really interesting. Generally, you are way beyond me and I don’t really know what you’re talking about all the time (due to my lack of education, not your lack of good writing). With that in mind, I had one thought. You said, “Indeed, the real false-belief maker in this situation is not the biologically innate neural structure in humans, but rather the practice of philosophy.” Wouldn’t the “practice of philosophy” be the result of the “biologically innate neural structures” of humans in action? Which would then mean they are one in the same?

I am very curious about your false-belief maker concept. I have wondered about that for a while, since, I as a Christian am obviously very wrong if naturalists, etc are right. If they are right, what natural phenomena caused me to believe such crazy things? Very very interesting…