(rought draft)
- Introduction.
For the purposes of this paper, I will define Utilitarianism (or Welfarism) as the claim that nothing except well-being has intrinsic value in order to distinguish it from other forms of Consequentialism. In this paper, I will defend the Utilitarian claim that there is nothing which can make one population (which I will equate with a system or state of affairs) have more intrinsic value than some other population which has an equal amount of well-being, pace Egalitarianism. In order to argue for this conclusion, I will argue that the rightness of equality can be demonstrated under Utilitarianism whereas under Egalitarianism it is simply assumed. A second argument could but will not be put forward along lines of parsimony: some moral theory, A, is better than any other moral theory, B, if A is able to explain the same data will fewer theoretical posits.
The structure of the paper will be as follows: In part 2 I will first define and clarify the terms ‘resources’ and ‘well-being’ since a clear understanding of the differences and relationship between the two will be vital to my argument. In part 3 I will put forth a Utilitarian argument for Egalitarian thinking by showing how Egalitarian intuitions follow from and are therefore explained by Utilitarianism combined with empirical data about the world as it actually is. In Part 4 I will compare two possible populations, A and B, in order to illustrate two claims which the Utilitarian is committed to as well as set the stage for an Egalitarian objection to the stronger of these two claims. In Part 5 I will introduce a third population, C, in order to present, in the strongest form, the Egalitarian claim that something other than well-being has intrinsic value by comparing A and C. In Part 6 I will respond to this objection by demonstrating how Utilitarianism can account for our intuitions regarding A and C without having to invoke additional sources of intrinsic value. I will conclude the paper in part 7 with a summary of the main argument of the paper.
- Resources and Well-Being: Differences and Relationships
Resources, loosely speaking, are the things such as goods and services which contribute to a person’s well-being. As such, resources have no intrinsic value, but are essentially instrumental in nature; they are what cause or contribute to well-being. Whereas well-being has intrinsic value, resources are only valuable inasmuch as they contribute to well-being. For simplicity, I will measure resources in terms of Resource Units (RU) and RU(i,j) will serve to denote the amount of RU required to increase a person’s well-being from i WU to j WU, terms which will be defined shortly.
Well-being, according to various different interpretations, could be any number of things: a mental state (happiness, pleasure, etc.), desire fulfillment or some properties which are objectively in a person’s interest regardless of their state of mind or particular desires. For the purposes of this paper, however, the exact nature of well-being will be largely irrelevant so long as the distinction between well-being and resources is kept in mind. Aside from the intrinsic/instrumental value distinction, one other difference between resources and well-being is important to note, namely that while it is easy to imagine the giving and exchanging of resources, the idea of giving and exchanging well-being makes little sense; mental states, desire fulfillment and/or objective interests are simply not the sort of things which can be given or exchanged. Throughout this paper, well-being will be measured in terms of Well-being Units (WU).
Not only are the differences between well-being and resources important to appreciating this paper, but the relationship between the two is as well. Each individual RU represents an equal amount of resources by very definition. Similarly, each individual WU represents an equal amount of well-being by very definition. However, the same amount of RU does not necessarily or even usually produce the same amount of WU. How many WU some amount of RU produces will depend upon at least one factor, namely the initial well-being of the person receiving the RU. Consider the case of our giving a small, inexpensive house to a millionaire versus our giving the same house to a homeless mother of two. The increase in well-being of the homeless family would almost certainly be greater than that of the millionaire, all other things being equal. This relationship can be spelled out as follows: For all quantities of WU, i and j, and any constant, k, if i<j, then RU(i,i+k) is almost certainly less than RU(j,j+k).
For closure, let us define a few more terms. Utilitarianism and Egalitarianism are both forms of Consequentialism. Consequentialism holds that one must act so as to maximize the overall intrinsic value of some population. To perform an action, according to the language I have been using, is equivalent to distributing resources in some way. Thus, Consequentialism hold that one must distribute resources within some population so as to maximize its overall intrinsic value.
- A Utilitarian Argument for Egalitarian Thinking
· P1: A given amount of RU usually produces a greater increase of WU in those with less WU than in those with more WU. (Empirical fact about the world)
· P2: Well-being is the only source of intrinsic value. (Utilitarianism)
· P3: A given amount of RU usually has greater intrinsic value to those who have less WU than to those with more WU. (P1, P2)
· P4: A given amount of RU ought to be distributed so as to maximize intrinsic value. (Consequentialism)
· P5: A given amount of RU usually ought to be distributed to those who have less WU rather than to those who have more WU. (P3 and P4)
This argument is meant to show that, since we get the highest WU/RU ratio when resources are given to those with the least well-being, Utilitarianism maintains that, all other things being equal, those with the least well-being ought to have priority in the distribution of resources. This, in turn, will lead to an equal distribution of well-being in the population. Accordingly, Utilitarianism is compatible with Egalitarian intuitions regarding equality and the distribution of resources. Furthermore, these intuitions can be shown to follow from and therefore be explained by Utilitarianism whereas under Egalitarianism they are simply posited, asserted or otherwise left unexplained.
- Populations A and B: The Utilitarian Position
Let us illustrate the Utilitarian position by imagining two populations of equal size. In population A half of the people have 100 WU while people in the other half have 200 WU. Within population B, however, each individual has 100 WU. According to Utilitarianism, as well as strong intuition, A is intrinsically better than B overall, a claim which can be unpacked as follows:
AB1: All other things being equal, if it were equally possible to create A or B, we ought to create A.
AB2: All other things being equal, if it were possible to do so, we ought to change B to A.
AB3: All other things being equal, even if it were possible to do so, we ought not change A to B.
These claims, again, seem rather intuitive. Utilitarianism is, however, committed to an even stronger position regarding A and B, namely that there is no respect in which B is intrinsically better than A. To this the Egalitarian must objection. Not only is such a claim not obviously true, but upon closer examination appears intuitively false.
- Populations A and C: The Egalitarian Objection
The Egalitarian, briefly, believes that, in addition to the well-being of some population, equality of well-being within that population also has intrinsic value. Accordingly, B is better than A in at least one respect, namely equality of well-being. Furthermore, the Egalitarian grants that A is indeed intrinsically better than B overall all, but only because intrinsic value of the well-being gained in A surpasses the intrinsic value of the equality lost in A.
This claim can be clearly illustrated by comparing A with another population of equal size, C, in which each individual has 150 WU. If well-being really is the only source of intrinsic value as Utilitarianism suggests, then neither A nor C is intrinsically better than the other overall. Intuition, however, suggests otherwise, for C seems to clearly be preferable to A. This claim can be spelled out by the following three claims:
· AC1: All other things being equal, if it were equally possible to create A or create C, we ought to create C.
· AC2: All other things being equal, if it were possible to do so, we ought to change A to C.
· AC3: All other things being equal, even if it were possible to do so, we ought not change C to A.
Let us be clear about the relationship which the A/C comparison is supposed to have to the original A/B comparison. Utilitarianism is committed to the claim, not only that A is intrinsically better than B overall, but that there is no respect in which B is intrinsically better than A. The Egalitarian objects that B is intrinsically better than A in some respect, namely equality of well-being, and argues as follows: If C is intrinsically better than A overall, the B is intrinsically better than A with respect to equality. C is intrinsically better than A. Thus, B is intrinsically better than A with respect to equality.
- A Utilitarian Explanation of Egalitarian Intuitions
The strategy which I will employ to defend Utilitarianism from the Egalitarian objection is a subtle one. For starters, it must be remembered that the Utilitarian carries presumption in the matter, for we are addressing an objection to Utilitarianism rather than providing a Utilitarian objection to Egalitarianism. Accordingly, I will attempt to show that the Egalitarian has not proven their claim that C is intrinsically better than A, and that their claim that B is intrinsically better than A in any respect is consequently unsupported. In doing this, I will not attempt to attack or reject the intuitions which underlie AC1-3. Instead, I will demonstrate how our Egalitarian intuitions in these cases actually follow from Utilitarian thinking.
There are at least two ways in which Utilitarianism justifies such intuitions. First, although such a claim will go almost entirely unsupported in this essay, it can be argued that if A and C described the distribution of resources rather than well-being, the Utilitarian would be committed to accepting claims AC1-3. It is arguably due to our intuitions not being fine-grained enough to distinguish between resources and well-being that AC1-3 seem so compelling. Second, and more important to the argument provided in section 3, it can be shown that the Utilitarian, while not committed to performing the acts described by AC1-3, is committed to endorsing the acts described by AC1-3. This final point is what allows the Utilitarian to walk the fine line of explaining and endorsing our intuitions regarding AC1-3 while at the same time rejecting the explicit claims made.[1]
Let us now turn our full attention to the scenario described by AC1. Beginning with an initial population in which one half has 100 WU and the other half has 150 WU, creating population A would consist in increasing the well-being of those with 150 WU by 50 WU while creating population C consists in an equal increase in the well-being of those with 100 WU. According to P1, however, creating A almost certainly requires more RU than does creating C. Accordingly, AC1 describes a scenario in which all other thins are almost certainly not equal which is just another way of saying that AC1 is rather implausible.
Let us approach this same point from another angle. Let us suppose that in the case of AC1 all other things are equal and that the amount of RU involved in each case is held constant. On the one hand, according to P1 it is highly unlikely that RU(100,150), the amount which would raise the half of the population with 100 WU to 150 WU, would be sufficient to increase the well-being of the other half from 150 WU to 200 WU. Thus, Utilitarianism holds that it is almost certainly the case that RU(100,150) ought to be distributed to those with 100 WU, just as P5 suggests. On the other hand, if we use RU(150,200) we get the same result, for giving that much RU to those with 100 WU will almost certainly increase their well-being by more than 50 WU. Thus, Utilitarianism again requires that RU(150,200) be given to those with 100 WU just as P5 states.
Finally, let us address AC1 head on by assuming that, by some miracle, RU(100,150) actually is equal to RU(150,200) in this particular case. It is at this point that the distinction between an act and the endorsement of that act comes into play. Due to the extreme unlikelihood of the situation described by AC1 ever arising in the actual world, it makes for a very reliable rule of thumb to always create C rather than A as P5 suggests. Thus, while strictly speaking Utilitarianism is neutral as to the performance of the act creating A or C, it is not neutral as to endorsement of the act of creating C over the act of creating A. In other words, the Utilitarian position in this case is that of being committed to rejecting AC1 on epistemic grounds while at the same time being equally committed to accepting AC1 on moral grounds. Again, it is because our intuitions are not fine-grained enough to distinguish between these two kinds of justification that AC1 seems more intuitively compelling than it actually is.
With these points in place from our treatment of AC1, the Utilitarian approach to AC2 and AC3 should be fairly obvious. Our reply in each case consists of three parts: First, it must be recognized that WU cannot be given or exchanged with anybody else, only resources can. Second, as P1 suggests, the same amount of WU in any case of resource redistribution will usually not correspond to the same amount of RU and, contrary to AC1-3, all other things will usually not be equal. Third, the less likely it is that all other things are equal, the more reliable P5 becomes as an Egalitarian rule of thumb, and the more strongly Utilitarianism commits us to endorsing the Egalitarian acts in question. These same steps can be employed in the cases of AC2 and AC3.
In the case of AC2, the RU(150,200) subtracted from those at 200 WU would almost certainly increase those at 100 WU by more than 50 WU. In the case of AC3, the RU(100,150) subtract from half of those at 150 WU would almost certainly not be sufficient to increase the other half of those at 150 WU by 50 WU. In either case, as they would arise in reality where all other things are not equal, Utilitarianism would almost certainly dictate that the resources be distributed according to Egalitarian principles. In the highly unlikely chance that such cases actually arise, the Utilitarian would still be morally required to endorse, but not perform(!) the Egalitarian act.
- Summary and Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that well-being is the unique source of intrinsic value by showing how empirical facts about the world (P1) combined with Utilitarian thinking are able to account for our Egalitarian intuitions. Furthermore, I have argued that Utilitarianism should be preferred to Egalitarianism since the former is able to explain our Egalitarian intuitions in a way which the latter cannot. I illustrated this claim by first comparing populations A and B and then overcoming the Egalitarian objections which arose in response to a comparison between A and C. In each case, a Utilitarian explanation was found which could account for our Egalitarian intuition without having to posit an additional source of intrinsic value.
[1] This line of thought closely parallels that of R. M. Hare in “What’s Wrong with Slavery?” in particular his claim that an “objection rests on an appeal to our ordinary intuitions; but that these are designed to deal with ordinary cases. They give no reliable guide to what we ought to say in highly unusual cases.”
